

Annular Core Research Reactor

Year in Review of Operational Challenges

SAND #TBD

TRTR Conference Sept 28-Oct 2, 2008

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
Abstract

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) Operations staff has faced several new challenges in the past year while maintaining the facility in an operational state. With potential budget cuts in the weapons complex and a reduced staff size, they successfully conducted a variety of experiments for customers from universities, and national and international labs. These accomplishments were achieved in spite of a *non-routine maintenance outage* and a recovery from a *high-power scram*. These challenges will be discussed in further detail herein.

The ACRR allows scientists and researchers to perform experiments and test components under extreme radiation exposure. The research reactor is used to perform in-pile experiments for radiation effects, reactor development, and safety requirements. These experiments are conducted by operating the reactor in steady state (4.0 MW licensed power) or by “pulsing” the reactor, which allows for extremely high power levels (60,000 MW licensed pulse limit) to be achieved for short periods of time.



Sandia
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Annular Core Research Reactor

- 264 reactor operations since last TRTR
- ~2/3 were pulse operations
 - Pulses: **43,000** MW peak power (scram at 45,000 MW), 280-310 MJ, 7-7.5 msec pulse width
(Limiting Control Setting: 500 MJ, 60,000 MW)
- Steady State: Limited by license to **4.0** MW (25 kW in the peak fuel element), but Plant Protection System trips still set at 2.7 MW.

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
Annular Core Research Reactor

Several **T**ransient **R**od **W**ithdrawal submode operations for Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) power profile development (October 07-June08).




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TRW Rod Drive Profile for (GNEP)



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TRW Power and Energy Profile for GNEP





Year in Review of Operational Challenges

Mechanical Failure of Transient Rods – Nov. 2007

- Increasing Transient Rod Bank Worth ⁽¹⁾ over time prior to break:

6/28/07: \$3.29

9/11/07: \$3.33

11/20/08: \$3.48

- Maintenance last performed:
 - TR A February 2007.
 - TR B October 2005.
 - TR C June 2007.

Note (1): TR Bank worth with Pb-B4C filter in Central Cavity. This filter has a negative reactivity contribution of about \$6.



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Mechanical Failure of Transient Rods – Nov. 2007

- TR A broke on pulse operation of 11/31/07. No indication that break effected pulse (dosimetry, energy, power, fire times all normal).
- TR A break determined during low power delayed critical measurement on 12/07/07.
- TR A was removed from ACRR Pool for repairs.

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TRA



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TRA



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TRA



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TRs B&C Removed for Examination as a Precaution



TR C: 3 steel pins
from retainer

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TR C

Held together by snug fit.



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TR B: Signs of plastic deformation since 1977





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Mechanical Failure of Transient Rods – November 2007

- Cause of retainer failures was due to improper pin maintenance practice.
- 4 new upper aluminum connecting rods (UACR) ordered from General Atomics (GA).
- Roy Ray (GA) and Paul Helmick (Sandia) were instrumental in procurement of parts and inspection.
- All rods UACR's replaced on TR A, B & C on Jan 31, 08
- Returned to normal operations after 2 months of downtime on Feb 2, 2008.

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Mechanical Failure of Transient Rods – November 2007



New UACR
from GA



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High Power Scram – Feb 15, 2008

Sequence of events:

- Opened facility – performed overhead crane checks.
- Removed experiment from previous day operations from ACRR Central Cavity.
- Performed Pre-operational checks (1 hr).
- ACRR startup in preparation for 300 MJ pulse. Delayed critical measurement at 0.05% indicated that TR bank worth just over \$3.5. Reactor Supervisor directs Reactor Operator to shutdown so that TR pedestals can be adjusted.
- ACRR startup for pulse operations. Successful pulse for customer: 276 MJ, 42 GW.



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High Power Scram – Feb 15, 2008

Sequence of events:

- Lunch break for operations staff.
- Removed experiment from central cavity.
- Cooled ACRR pool to 10 °C.
- Brief with staff for max power steady state operation.
- Commenced startup of ACRR for 2.4 MW operation @ 3:15 PM. (Last time achieved: Summer 2004)
- Control rod drive anomaly while ramping to 100% -RO switches rod drive shim speed to “fast” to compensate for fuel temperature feedback. Seconds later, the RO determines automatic rod leveling is driving rods inward. RO allows auto leveling to correct condition.



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High Power Scram – Feb 15, 2008

Sequence of events:

- With RX power decreasing through 25% and anomaly corrected, RS/RO team resume ramp to 100% power.
- RO shims Control Rods (CRs) out to raise power & verifies on DAC4 (Wide Range Monitor) then shifts focus to DAC1 (Rod Control Monitor) to confirm all 6 CRs moving.
- RO returns focus to DAC4 to see Rx power increasing through 90% and releases shim switch.
- Rx power scram occurs as indicated on the Plant Protection System. (Not a TSR violation.)
- Normal shutdown indication observed. Rx operations secured, Line Management and DOE informed.

ACRR Control Room Layout







View from RO Chair



RO Primary Focus



PPS1







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- DIGITAL
- GRD FAULT
 - PPS1 NON OP
 - %PWR BYPASS
 - NVT BYPASS**
 - SCRAM




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PPS2




NVT **0.3** NV **30**

- DIGITAL
- PPS2 NON OP
 - %PWR BYPASS
 - NVT BYPASS**
 - SCRAM



Data from Pulse Diagnostics

Power And Yield





Contributing Causes to Scram

- **Most steady state operations for experimenters do not occur in the fuel temperature feedback regime. RO proficiency requirements did not previously specify any particular power requirements.**
- **“Leftover” rod leveling program initiates only after rod levels vary between rods by 200 rod units (RU)(2 cm) – about 60 cents worth of reactivity.**
- **No audible or visual indications on DAC4 that rod leveling is actuated.**
- **Critical rod height for the Control Rod bank much different from initial delayed critical measurement.**



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Changes made to facility after scram:

- **Audible and visual (on DAC4) indications if Auto leveling initiates.**
- **Operator proficiency for steady state must occur at or above 80% Rx power (experience fuel temperature feedback).**
- **RO can turn Auto leveling feature “off” – indication on DAC4.**
- **Rod speed indication (fast/slow) added to DAC4.**



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Changes made to facility after scram (continued):

- **Notes added to pulse and steady state operating procedures addressing effects of fuel temperature feedback and use of AUTO RUNDOWN if needed.**
- **Auto leveling occurs at 50 RU (0.5 cm) vs. 200 RU – smaller reactivity shifts.**




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Operational impact:


- DOE did not permit Rx operations for 13 days. Then, steady state power limited to low power runs <20% (no fast speed rod motion).
- Allowed to return to pulse operations (no fast speed rod motion).
- Later, DOE has allowed return to 100% steady state operations with a restriction that all rod motion by the RO above 0.05% power be in slow speed unless required for programmatic needs.



Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility Critical Experiment (CX)



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Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility Critical Experiment (CX)

Purpose of CX:

- **Present the broad safety case for the Seven Percent Critical Experiment (7uPCX)**
- **Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) project 01-124, “Reactor Physics and Criticality Benchmark Evaluations for Advanced Nuclear Fuel”**
- **Provide training for LANL critical assembly operators**

Primary objective:

- **Project is to provide benchmark data for validating commercial reactor physics methods for fuel enrichments greater than 5 weight percent ^{235}U in geometries that can be modeled.**





Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility Critical Experiment (CX)

- **7uPCX will use UO₂ fuel pellets removed from fuel elements fabricated in the mid-1960s that have been stored at Pennsylvania State University since 1969. The fuel pellets have been fabricated into new aluminum tubes for use in the experiment.**
- **Fuel cladding: 3003 aluminum, element height: 74 cm, enrichment: 6.9%.**



**Multiplication factor (top)
and incremental fuel element
worth (bottom) as a function
of fuel array size for 0.800
cm pitch critical assembly
with no poison in the
moderator.**





CX Dump Valve Operation for Scram





Nuclear Diversity among Sandia National Labs Reactor Operators

RO	Navy RX	Comm. RX	Univ. RX	DOE RX	BS	MS	PE
A	X		X	X	X	X	X
B	X		X	X	X	X	X
C				X			
D	X			X			
E	X	X		X			
F	X			X			
G	X	X		X			
H			X	X	X	X	
I	X			X	X	X	
J	X			X	X		



Nuclear Diversity

- **Brings breadth and depth to an operational organization.**
- **Will be a needed element in the nuclear renaissance.**
- **Sometimes the only thing we will have in common among our nations different reactor facilities is the atom, not how we split!**





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Result:
**Determined staff always
striving for Operational
Excellence!!!**



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Questions?